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On September 13, 2017, the European Commission (Commission) presented a proposal for 
regulating the screening of FDI flows into the EU
1
 (based on Art. 207(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU)), as requested by France, Germany and Italy. Although the proposal 
requires member states to notify the Commission of planned or completed non-EU FDI (i.e., M&As 
and greenfield investment) that are under scrutiny according to national legislations, it also provides 
the Commission with the power to monitor FDI that could affect projects of EU interest on grounds 
of security or public order. The Commission would only have the power to issue non-binding 
opinions (that members should take into account) on whether the FDI at issue represents a risk for 
EU security or public order. Moreover, the proposal does not require those members that still do not 
have a form of FDI control to adopt such a measure. It is unclear, thus, how these states could notify 
the Commission of projects that raise concerns without a screening mechanism. 
 
EU Nordic members have already declared that they will oppose the Commission’s proposal which, 
in their view, could harm free trade. Similarly, Greece, Portugal and Spain also are dissatisfied with 
the proposal. They might prefer an EU body for monitoring non-EU FDI that would neither grant 
screening power to the Commission, nor affect existing national mechanisms. Other member states 
could oppose any EU intervention on FDI for opposite reasons. Indeed, some of them may wish to 
keep FDI screening on security grounds under their exclusive control, given their “sole 
responsibility” in protecting their national security, as recognized by Art. 4(2) of the Treaty on EU 
(TEU), although this provision should be interpreted restrictively.2 
 
Alternatively, an act harmonizing the existing national measures of FDI control could be proposed 
that would not include any consultative power for the Commission, but that instead would require 
member states that still lack an FDI screening system to adopt one. Moreover, such a EU act could 
include clear guidance to states to adopt or amend their national measures of FDI control or the 
protection of EU security and public order. 
 
Beyond the mentioned options, the most ambitious idea would be the establishment of a European 
Committee on Foreign Investment (ECFI) that would replace existing national mechanisms.3 
Indeed, the most recent case law of the EU Court of Justice confirms that the EU’s exclusive 
competence on FDI (i.e., Art. 207(2) TFEU) covers not only FDI liberalization and protection, but 
also restrictions adopted on public interest grounds.4 Hence, it could be argued that the EU has 




An ECFI could be modeled on both the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and 
the Canadian FDI control system under the Investment Canada Act (ICA), to protect the EU’s 
economy, security and public order. Indeed, the US notion of security is broad and covers sectors 
linked to defense and critical technologies and resources. This concept of security, together with the 
“net benefit test” provided by the ICA (according to which the government must consider the 
effects of FDI on the economy, e.g., employment and productivity), could be points of reference.  
 
Obviously, an ECFI could not exactly replicate these models. Indeed, it should consider the 
responsibilities of member states in protecting their essential interests regarding defense, as 
recognized in Art. 346(1)(b) of the TFEU: members are free to adopt any measures necessary to 
protect their military production, including restrictions on foreign ownership.5 Therefore, given that 
EU competence is limited in this sector, an ECFI could be provided with the power to screen non-
EU FDI at least in non-military strategic sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications, transport, hi-
tech industries, banking, critical infrastructure). In particular, an ECFI should be able to block (or 
condition) inward FDI that affects security and critical economic concerns (without violating the 
EU’s international obligations). 
 
EU-wide FDI screening would be more efficient than the present system based on national 
measures: it would reduce a number of FDI limitations, as well as the number of competent 
authorities.
6
 An ECFI would provide foreign investors a simple, transparent and predictable 
framework of FDI control, while serving the European general interest. 
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 Indeed, since the EU has gained exclusive FDI competence, states’ competence on national security cannot be broadly 
interpreted, so as to impinge on the EU’s exclusive competence. That would constitute a violation of the principle of 
conferral (Art. 5 TEU). 
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 Only Bulgaria, Estonia, Luxembourg, Hungary, and Malta do not have any limitation on FDI 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603941/EPRS_BRI(2017)603941_EN.pdf). 
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